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Organizational change is discussed in the context of a conceptual model resting on philo-
sophical, sociological, and anthropological foundations. Distinguishing between an
open and a closed form of organization, the authors focus on two theses. The first is that
organizations as societal systems are marked by the simultaneous existence of two forms
of organization that are mutually exclusive in part, with the resulting combinations or
mixes of the two forms having the character of a compromise. The second thesis is that
these combinations or mixes of open and closed organizational elements tend to be in
flux, giving organizational change a partly cyclical structure. The authors’goal is to draw
on these two theses to develop the theory of organizational change and elaborate the
implications that this interpretation has for organizational change in daily practice.
Discussion within the business community has focused for some while on new forms
of organization, ranging from the shift toward flat hierarchies; flexible, decentralized
self-organization; and network-like structures of lateral cooperation. As pointed out
by Daft and Lewin (1993), however, such new forms of organization lack theoretical
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models offering guidance on how to cope with the processes of change they entail. To
help fill this gap, we examine a conceptual model rooted in philosophical, sociologi-
cal, and anthropological tenets. Differentiating between an open and a closed form of
organization, we focus on two theses:
1. Organizations as societal systems are marked by the simultaneous existence of two forms
of organization that are mutually exclusive in part, and the resulting combinations or
mixes of the two forms have the character of a compromise.
2. These combinations or mixes of open and closed organizational elements tend to be in
flux, giving organizational change a partly cyclical structure.
Viewed from this perspective, the new forms of organizations cited above can be
interpreted as recombinations or shifts in the balance between open and closed
elements. In this article, we draw on these two theses to develop the theory of organiza-
tional change and elaborate the implications that our interpretation has for organiza-
tional change in daily practice. In the first section, we introduce our conceptual model
and illustrate both its aspect of compromise and the free-flowing character of societal
systems. The second section is a presentation of this basic concept at the organiza-
tional level. Conclusions for a theory of organizational change are drawn in the third
section. In the fourth section, we show which specific practical consequences there are
for the process of managing change with this approach.
THE INITIAL MODEL: OPEN AND CLOSED SOCIETY
Societal Systems as Compromise
Let us first consider two contrasting patterns of thought, referred to by Popper
(1980) as the open society and the closed society (Boerner, 1994). Unlike Popper, who
had social policy in mind when making the case for an open society, we assert that both
patterns have specific advantages. In reality, so we assume, there are normally mixes or
combinations of the open and closed patterns. For analytical purposes, however, it
makes sense first to characterize the two poles in their pure form (see Figure 1).
A fundamental distinction between the thinking of the open society and that of the
closed society is the question of whether societal reality is perceived primarily as the
work of humans and, hence, as something alterable (the human being as subject, the
voluntarist principle) or whether it is interpreted as an immutable result of the work of
higher powers (such as providence or fate) over which humans have no influence (the
human being as object, the determinist principle). Another characteristic distinction
between the two patterns of thought is the open society’s assumption that people pur-
sue different interests but, for all their dissimilarity, nevertheless have equal value and
equal rights. In the closed society, by contrast, it is presumed that interests are homoge-
neous in principle. There, too, people are viewed as being different, but the conse-
quence is that people are treated unequally and are accorded unequal rights. In the
open society, all thinking and action revolves around the individual, so conditions for
protecting personal freedom and allowing for individuality are sought. The closed
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society is dominated by the collectivist pattern, in which individuals are to subordinate
themselves to the interests of the whole. That arrangement, in turn, bequeaths the
closed society with value patterns and practices of its own. In the open society, it
largely is presumed that human knowledge is always imperfect and therefore can never
be anything but tentative, whereas in the closed society, available knowledge is held to
be error free and definitive. In this sense, Figure 1 illustrates the different basic
assumptions (Schein, 1987) to which one can trace back the two poles represented by
the open and the closed societies.
Our assumption is that people do not want only the open or only the closed society
but both. Human beings desire harmony and trust but also creative diversity and ten-
sion, law and order but also freedom and autonomy, clarity and orientation but also
openness and critical thinking, leadership but also partnership with their peers. This
insight that we must proceed from two demands rather than one is due largely, say, to
Bischof’s (1985, 1996) contribution to modern anthropology thus far. Bischof (1996)
asserted that the ego develops from the dynamic tension between the desire for belonging-
ness (the closed society) and the need for autonomy and independence (the open society).
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FIGURE 1: Value Pattern and Dimensions of Consciousness in the Closed Society and the Open Society
The anthropological need for both the old and the new causes a problem because, in
reality, the open society and the closed society tend to be mutually exclusive. This sec-
ond key assumption, which we adopt from Popper (1980), is illustrated by the bipolar
arrangement of Figure 1.
Gains on one side thus involve the risk of losses on the other. For example, law and
order (Dimension IV) can be advocated in the spirit of protecting the collective. Spe-
cifically, one could recommend the installation of listening devices in private homes as
a way to fight criminality (an issue being widely considered in Germany). Following
through on such measures would indeed constitute protection of the collective but
would infringe on the liberty of the individual because of the resulting invasion of pri-
vacy. If one takes a liberal stance by siding against the installation of listening devices
and for the protection of personal freedom, the decision will hamper police efforts to
maintain law and order.
To deal with the either-or issue, some compromises are possible. Regarding Fig-
ure 1 as the illustration of a semantic differential, let us measure each dimension on a
scale numbered from 1 (the open pole) through 5 (the closed pole). In any given socie-
tal system, each dimension can be practiced at the intermediate level, 3. The dilemma
described in the previous paragraph, for instance, could be managed with a compro-
mise. People may agree to establish a graduated surveillance system that does not pry
completely into the private sphere but does enable police to intensify efforts to protect
the community as a whole (the strategy of mixing open and closed elements). The other
variant (the strategy of combining) consists in the fact that a societal system has unmis-
takably open features in certain dimensions and distinctly closed features in other
dimensions. In Dimensions I and V shown in Figure 1, for example, a societal system
can clearly open itself up (Level 4: emphasis on experimentation and learning) to fos-
ter economic, technological, and scientific innovation. At the same time, it can narrow
itself in the three societal dimensions (Level 4: emphasis on community and consen-
sus) to cushion the social impacts of the severity associated with innovative competi-
tion. This model may have been characteristic of Japanese society, at least until the late
1980s (Y. Yawata, personal communication, August 13, 1994).
Depending on how abstract a view one takes, compromises can be differentiated
intradimensionally as well. Within Dimension IV, for example, the right to demon-
strate could be expanded (1) and simultaneously police units could be sent in to combat
the narcotics trade (4). This response would be the strategy of combination. By con-
trast, one can deal with the problem of drunk driving, for example, by applying gradu-
ated degrees of freedom (3). This response would be the strategy of mixing. In this
context, compromises (mixes and combinations) do not resolve the polarity between
open society and closed society but only defuse them (Gebert & Boerner, 1995;
Mintzberg, 1979).
A second explanation for the character of compromise found in societal systems is
that the open and closed poles and their ensuing compromises always have negative
secondary effects (see Table 1). Allowing diversity (e.g., as an expression of a particu-
lar understanding of tolerance) and attempting to work with a variety of interests in a
democratic way based on the rule of law is tedious, and the transaction costs are high.
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Macrosocially, individuality and freedom can turn into egoism and anarchy, tolerance
into arbitrariness and lack of direction, equal opportunity into a lowering of standards
to a common denominator, and so forth. The merits of the open pattern clearly are
accompanied by distinct disadvantages. Apparently, the more the open pattern is prac-
ticed, the higher its “costs.”
These costs, or minuses, jeopardize the pluses. One implication is that freedom will
be jeopardized by the anarchy to which it opened the door in the first place, a danger
that can become an outright threat (Bischof, 1996). This eventuality gives rise to the
paradox that freedom must be both fostered and limited simultaneously. Even if only
one of the two sides were to be demanded (the open or the closed structure), reality
would nevertheless contain compromises between the two worlds because having only
one or the other jeopardizes its realization. For both reasons, societal systems will
entail mixes and combinations of open and closed features and will thereby have the
character of compromise. In any societal system, the implication is that some demands
will in principle go unmet.
The Fluidity of Compromises
The fluid character of compromises within societal systems stems from specific
objective and subjective processes.
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TABLE 1
Attractiveness and Tediousness of the Closed and the Open Society
Closed Society Open Society
+ – + –
Static: stability, Rigidity, paralysis I Hope, innovation, Instability/chaos,
predictability, flexibility responsibility, failure,
orientation opportunism
Dynamic: incorporation Forced conformity, Enlightenment/ Faith in intrigues,
into a movement, desolation education dissatisfaction
feeling of security
Harmony, confirmation, Stagnation, infantilism, II Pluralism, potential Fighting/conflict,
trust possibility of for development, transaction costs,
manipulation, isolation creative tension distrust
Differences in status Discrimination, III Equal opportunity, Leveling
master-servant equal treatment
External security/order Coercion, terror/ IV Individuality, Egoism, seclusion,
totalitarianism liberty/autonomy anarchy
Clarity/certainty, Dogmatism, ideology V Critical rationality, Arbitrariness, lack of
meaning tolerance, ability direction, tentativeness
to learn
Objective processes. As shown in Table 1, increasingly noticeable unplanned nega-
tive secondary effects (see above) result from the practice of either of the two patterns.
(The triggering of these unplanned secondary effects is not deterministic, of course.
The appearance of the secondary effects depends on situational conditions.) Over
time, experience with these unplanned secondary effects causes the prevailing social
order to be seen as increasingly questionable and problematic—the first nudge toward
change in existing compromises.
Of course, the issues that the plus and minus signs subsume in Table 1 are not inher-
ently positive or negative. They become so from the viewpoint of the particular social
pattern under consideration. Disputes and conflicts, for example, are an evil in the
ground rules of harmony that are embraced in the closed society. From the perspective
of the open society, however, disputes and conflicts are constructive interim steps of a
development. The relation between master and slave is a nightmare to the open society,
but to a closed society, it communicates embedment in the protective structures of the
social collective. The extent to which such systems-specific interpretations are elabo-
rated into ideologies is a key aspect that stabilizes prevailing compromises. However,
if one accepts Bischof’s (1996) anthropological argument that people throughout their
lives demand security, orientation, a sense of belongingness, and autonomy and free-
dom, then “disputes and conflict” will become an evil after a certain point even in the
value system of the open society, just as the master-and-slave relation will become an
evil after a certain point in the value system of the closed society. In other words, given
compromises are therefore at least latently unstable.
The sort of change in societal systems does not seem to proceed willy-nilly.
Because the costs of the open pattern (e.g., egoism and anarchy) consist essentially in
the loss of the goods provided by the closed pattern (e.g., security and order), increas-
ing practice of the open pattern and the emergence of its implied costs enhance the
attractiveness of the closed pattern (and vice versa). The process of change in socie-
tal systems is therefore likely to be cyclical (see Bischof, 1996, p. 42; Mintzberg &
Westley, 1992). This presumption is supported by the fact that observable processes of
change can indeed be interpreted as cyclical movements between comparatively open
and comparatively closed patterns. To illustrate this point, we now consider primarily
the example of the Federal Republic of Germany.
In what has been called the 1968 phase, West German society as a whole largely
opened up and went through a change in consciousness in all the dimensions listed in
Figure 1, above. It is true that part of that change may have taken place only at the rhe-
torical level, but it also occurred as unmistakable changes of reality (such as changes in
legislation). Within families, it led to visibly changed (often “antiauthoritarian”)
child-rearing practices.
The main driving force of the 1968 movement was the assumption that people
themselves could shape societal reality (voluntarist principle, Dimension I) and could,
through popular enlightenment and social change, overcome outmoded constraints
and encrusted (i.e., “authoritarian”) structures—the minuses of the old order. With the
concept of social partnership as conflict, the principle that the interests of labor and
management are heterogeneous was given substance through legally mandated
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industrial democracy and the right to strike (Dimension II). The idea of equal value and
equal opportunity (Dimension III) was expressed in the campaign to reform schools
and universities, as well as other domains of society such as the penal system. At the
same time, the emancipation and liberation of the individual was declared as an objec-
tive (Dimension IV). The image of the world held by the pre-1968 establishment was
challenged, and the question of meaning was posed anew. The principle of learning
and the assumption that all knowledge was imperfect and tentative was tested in the
pursuit of new lifestyles and forms of work (Dahrendorf, 1987).
The atmosphere of a new beginning has vanished since the late 1980s. In Dimen-
sion V, the escalating demand for sects signals the increasing attractiveness of the
closed pattern and the meanings it offers. In Dimension IV, harsher criminal justice is
being discussed as one response, among others, to the problem of crime. In Dimension
III, antiauthoritarian child rearing is being castigated as a symptom of the “permissive
society,” with discipline and effort being called for. A collectivist mind-set stopped the
flow of asylum seekers to Germany after a number of homes for foreign workers were
burned and as xenophobia dramatically intensified in the country. Disaffection with
politics (Politikverdrossenheit) was voted 1993’s term of the year in Germany. Today,
this attitude relates partly to abuses of political power for personal gain (Scheuch &
Scheuch, 1992). Another target of criticism is the self-inflicted paralysis of democratic
parties, for no decisions are being made despite the desperate need for them. The calls
for stronger leadership and a restriction of Germany’s federal structure are multiplying
(Gessenharter, 1994). Changes from “authoritarian” to “antiauthoritarian” and then to
“repressive” are observable and can be interpreted as a cyclical process based on the
assumptions depicted in Table 1.
Both the rising chorus of complaints about the tediousness of the open pattern and
the growing attractiveness of the closed pattern are not unique to Germany. Similar
descriptions exist of the United States (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton,
1985; Taylor, 1993; Walzer, 1993), where comparable processes of openness were
experienced in the late 1960s (e.g., student unrest and protest against racial discrimina-
tion (Aram, 1976). In the debate on communitarianism, the question of how the crisis
in liberalism can be overcome is heard today along with the call to build on traditional
values and habits of the heart (Bellah et al., 1985). Stronger moorings in the church and
greater reintegration into decentralized local administration are intended to afford a
sense of meaning and orientation to enable the individual to live with the burdens stem-
ming from a liberalized polity.
Subjective processes. An important mechanism is that the appraisal of a given situa-
tion changes over time at the subjective level even if it remains objectively constant.
Even when the objective circumstances do not change, situational conditions that used
to be experienced as advantageous come to be felt less and less as advantages, and
situational conditions that used to be experienced as drawbacks come to be felt
increasingly as disadvantageous. This perception has to do with the familiar phenom-
ena of adaptation and deprivation. It means that existing opportunities to satisfy needs
decline in value at the same time as nonexistent opportunities to satisfy needs rise in
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value. Such appreciation and depreciation ultimately condition shifts in the degrees to
which social orders are seen as attractive, for the perception of their balance between
advantages and disadvantages subjectively changes even though the objective situa-
tion remains unaltered.
Such processes at the subjective level presumably played an important role in
former West Germany’s cyclical dynamics as just described. They are immediately
apparent in relation to the socialist system of former East Germany, in which accep-
tance of the balance between advantages and disadvantages of the country’s largely
closed structure had begun to erode by the mid-1980s. The deficiencies of centralized
bureaucratic planning were felt more distinctly than ever. The advantages of the closed
structure (e.g., a low crime rate) were no longer perceived as such. This decline in
acceptance of then-current conditions was paralleled by a rise in the positive view of a
future-oriented balance in which the free West was one-sidedly glorified as “golden.”
The Western car (Mercedes-Benz) was idealized and marveled at everywhere as the
symbol of prosperity and liberty. Although Western television was received by East
German citizens, the well-documented drawbacks of West German society plainly did
not make a sufficient impression in Eastern popular awareness (Adler, 1992; Pollack,
1992).
In terms of dissonance theory, the parallelism and mutual reinforcement of the
depreciation of then-current conditions and appreciation of future-oriented conditions
have the function of enabling the individual to make decisions and take action. Simul-
taneously, though, illusions tend to be fostered as well, so that when the citizens of
former East Germany were subsequently confronted by the real conditions of the free
West in the Federal Republic of Germany, many individuals were bound to be bitterly
disappointed (Gebert & Boerner, 1995). Seen in the context of cyclical change, disillu-
sionment of that kind breeds analogous redresses in the balance of merits and draw-
backs, whereby it is the past that is idealized just as the future had been. The situational
features that had been appraised negatively are forgotten or repressed. Nostalgia sets
in, as demonstrated by the rebound of support for the former Communist party. This
process is also reflected in the fact that former East German cigarettes are being
smoked in the eastern part of Berlin and that the Trabant (the best known car of former
East German manufacture) is making a comeback (see Barber, 1996, p. 265).
We conclude that dilemmatic structure in itself—the concept that every sort of com-
promise between features of open society and closed society develops its own specific
disadvantages—is not solely responsible for the fluidity of compromises. Additional
dynamic thrust that keeps compromises fluctuating is independently delivered by the
psychological way in which the dilemma is dealt with. The demand for two worlds
standing in what at least tends to be an unresolvable dilemmatic relation to each other
thus proves to be a key agent of change. (Of course, these forces cannot explain the spe-
cific historical manifestation of change processes, such as the political form of the
intra-German regime shift. We focus instead on the objective and subjective processes
preceding those changes of that nature.)




It should be remembered that Popper (1980) raised an issue of social policy. For that
reason, we emphasize that we are largely adopting only his thesis about an antagonistic
relation between two fundamental social orders. In particular, we do not advocate his
generalizing argument in favor of the open society, which to us seems problematic in
the social sphere and especially at the company level. We are transferring only a spe-
cific facet of Popper’s viewpoint to the organizational context. This approach seems
promising to us because it was possible to identify both the dimensionality and the
advantages and disadvantages of the basic pattern (see Table 1) easily at the micro-
economic level (Boerner, 1994) and to document them empirically in case studies
(Boerner & Gebert, 1997). At the same time, however, we see basic differences
between society and companies as aggregates, and those differences are important to
our line of thinking. At least a private enterprise, for example, has more limited ends
focused specifically on economic objectives and is characterized by specific legal
ownership that can point a private business toward mixes or combinations tending
toward the closed pole and that tie the functionality of compromises primarily to eco-
nomic criteria. Although differences between the organizational and social levels are
evident, the fact is that both societal systems involve compromises and shifts therein.
Of course, we do not assume that the possibly cyclical processes at the organiza-
tional and social level are mutually independent. As part of society and as an open sub-
system vis-à-vis the environment, the organization has a complex interactive
relationship with society. From the microperspective, the fact that interaction exists is
plausible because actors have multiple roles (e.g., as members of community councils,
as managers of companies, as fathers, and as members of associations) and therefore
are embedded in a complex process of exchange with other systems. Whereas the exis-
tence of such interaction is a fact, it is theoretically less clear what directions the effects
of these interdependencies have. The obvious parallelism of fairly unidirectional
social and microeconomic shifts in compromises in former West Germany during the
1968 phase and in the late 1980s suggests that social shifts (and arguably cyclical ones
at that) can foster organizational shifts in the same direction and vice versa. Under
which conditions one can expect these parallel shifts is a question for further theoreti-
cal work.
Compromises at the Organizational Level
Returning to the previously cited specifics of corporate reality, we can legitimate in
several ways the hypothesis that mixes and combinations of open and closed features
exist at the microeconomic level, too. In addition to the twofold demand outlined
above at the level of the individual, one can assume a dual objective at the organiza-
tional level. Companies demand innovativeness, the ability to change, and creativity to
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adapt to increases in the intensity of competition. But organizations also pursue objec-
tives such as achieving and maintaining stability, reliability, a capacity to act, and coor-
dinated processes to keep to time and cost budgets. Whereas the organizational
objective of innovativeness tends to suggest a policy of decentralization, critical
awareness, and emphasis on the possibility of learning (i.e., a process of opening), the
other cluster of objectives (stability, capacity to act, and reliability) tends to require
technical regulations and standards and control strategies (closed structures). In other
words, one finds compromises between open and closed features in industrial plants,
too, because of their twofold organizational demands.
The similarity with the conditions described for the social level goes further. Even if
a twofold organizational demand did not exist, that is, even if the organization did not
simultaneously pursue the capacity to act and the capacity to change, seeking only the
latter (innovativeness) would necessitate closed, constraining patterns of action to
cushion the secondary effects (or what Frese, 1995, has called costs of autonomy)
incurred by a policy of extensive opening (Stacey, 1992; Volberda, 1996). The classi-
cal finding reported by the Aston group (Child, 1973)—a significant positive correla-
tion between decentralization (a policy of opening) and the installation of bureaucratic
control procedures (formalization and standardization as a policy of closure)—can be
interpreted as an expression of this attempt to achieve balance. In this context, combi-
nations between open and closed features are not only assumed by us to exist in theory,
they have already been confirmed empirically (Child, 1973).
The Fluidity of Compromises
Shifts in compromises create new realities within a business and hence both per-
sonal and operational disadvantages to which the business subsequently responds. For
example, decentralization is accompanied by specific costs of autonomy (Frese, 1995)
that prompt a business to recentralize. The recentralization tends to be followed by
bureaucratic ossification and losses of motivation, costs that spur the business to
decentralize again. The fact that this apparently cyclical process has been frequently
described in the literature (Blau, 1964) affords empirical support also for the thesis that
compromises shift within the organizational context (for further descriptions of
intraorganizational swings and oscillations, see Mintzberg & Westley, 1992,
pp. 50-51).
Indicators of Opening, Closure, and Corresponding Compromises
First, we present different patterns of action that we have hypothetically classified
under the open or closed pattern and the various different dimensions in Figure 1.
Table 2 gives an initial descriptive clue to discerning a business’s specific combination
between open and closed features. We first cite an example to illustrate the logic of our
classification and then examine the issue of classification.
The voluntarist principle (the understanding that societal reality is not subject to
inherent natural laws but instead at least partially reflects the result of human will) is
manifested within a business in various ways, such as in the process of organizational
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development. In the closed plant, by contrast, the determinist principle tends to be
emphasized, a pattern manifested in the prevailing notion of technological, economic,
and other constraints and immutability (“that’s just how people are”).
Now, the reader will not be persuaded by every attempt we have made in Table 2 to
assign specific patterns of action to specific poles and dimensions. The basic problem
of classification is illustrated by what has been referred to as transformational leader-
ship. According to Bennis and Nanus (1985), the difficulty is not a lack of manage-
ment techniques but a lack of leadership. It is in this context that transformational
leadership (see Gardner & Avolio, 1998) is to be regarded. In Table 2, this type of lead-
ership is associated with the closed society, a classification we explain and critically
examine in the following passages.
Visions are partly defined by the fact that they are formulated in a relatively
abstract, vague way and that their time horizon lies far in the future. This characteristic
distinguishes them from what are called objectives. A vision’s vagueness and the diffi-
culty of testing whether it has ever been achieved make this strategy appear to be
closed in nature because there are no grounds for subjecting it to rational processes of
control.
With transformational leadership, an additional important factor is that the vision
be communicated to the workforce by a charismatic figure. Transformational leader-
ship is thereby sustained mainly by an emotional relation between leader and follow-
ers (Schelsky, 1975; Weber, 1922/1978). In the end, the latter are persuaded not by
reason but by the personality of the leader, and they do what they do not because they
see why but because they believe in the charismatic leader. The charismatic leader (in
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TABLE 2
Action Patterns Promoting Closedness and Openness in Companies
Dimensions of Actions or Instruments Actions or Instruments
Consciousness Promoting the Closed Society Promoting the Open Society
I. Determinist/ Stress on imperatives (technological, Procedural innovations, organizational
voluntarist economic, anthropobiological) development, team development, role
negotiation
II. Homogeneous/ Cultivation of human relations, Stress on Labor-Management Act,
heterogeneous symbolic leadership, Christmas openness in dealing with conflict,
interests celebrations “internal” markets, competition
III. Unequal/equal Rank-specific cafeterias, assistants Flattened hierarchies, integration of
value for carrying luggage and operating foreigners, advancement of women,
overhead projectors lateral cooperation
IV. Collective/ Uniforms, badges, corporate identity, Toleration of right to contradict, granting
individual reward for company loyalty, of a measure of freedom for action,
wholistic planning, closed entrepreneurship, self-organization,
boundaries decentralization, destandardization
V. Error-free/ Expertocracy, transformational Bottom-top assessment, tolerance of
imperfect leadership, “top-down” definition errors, organizational learning,
of values, business reengineering, tolerance of ambiguity
organizational transformation
the classical sense) has as little interest in questioning himself as the followers have in
questioning him, a relation that undermines the foundations of openness between
leader and followers. By contrast, interaction of the type in an open society is nour-
ished by what in principle is the mutual questioning and the abiding reciprocal poten-
tial for error.
In distinguishing a course of action from an objective of action, we have classified
transformational leadership under the closed pole because the opaqueness and emo-
tional foundations of the “path” (or means) associate it with closure (Dimension V).
As the contrast between, say, Mahatma Gandhi and Adolf Hitler as transformational
leaders penetratingly shows, open goals (equality between Hindus and Moslems, tol-
erance) or closed goals (preeminence of the “German master race,” intolerance) can be
pursued along this path. It follows that an action cannot be labeled as only open or only
closed. Instead, we distinguish between degrees of openness and closure, with the
degree rising when the means and the ends of an action point in the same direction.
Transformational leadership is not only open and closed, it is simultaneously multi-
dimensional. It can suggestively reinforce the voluntarist principle in Dimension I and
therefore gravitates toward the open pole while substantially communicating certainty
in Dimension V and thereby can veer toward the closed pole. Seen in the context of the
different dimensions shown in Figure 1, the action can be described as a profile. In this
manner, the description of balance based on Table 2, in which an action is character-
ized simply as binary and unidimensional, can be used only as an initial rough check-
list to delineate a specific compromise between open and closed features in an
organization. For more precise classification, one can supplement this procedure by
describing profiles of selected actions or patterns of actions that are assumed to be
especially characteristic of the business or especially effective at marking longitudinal
change in it.
In our own study (Gebert, Boerner, & Matiaske, 1998), we developed a standard-
ized questionnaire keyed precisely to the theoretical dimensions shown in Figure 1.
The 55 items of this instrument were validated with a sample containing 361 managers
from approximately 60 different organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Factor analysis confirmed our assumption of tridimensionality (anthropological,
societal, and epistemological), a finding that validated our construct. The respondents
were asked to rate the business (plant or branch) on a 5-point scale. The following
examples illustrate the items presented. For the anthropological dimension (I),
“Employees think there is a lot here that not only needs changing but that can be
changed, and they say so” (open pole). For the societal dimension (II, III, and IV),
“This company’s top management is repeatedly emphasizing the philosophy that
we’re all in the same boat” (closed pole). For the epistemological dimensions (V),
“This company is an expertocracy. The judgment of experts is solicited even on trivial
matters” (closed pole).
In terms of criteria-related validity, we found that organizations were rated as being
more innovative than their competition if their mix or combination had a relatively
high degree of openness as defined above. We found distinctions particularly in the
anthropological dimension (Gebert et al., 1998, p. 21). Although there were pattern-
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like significant positive correlations between the three dimensions named above, there
emerged an interdimensional form of compromise interesting for the train of thought
in this article. In the new federal states (Länder) created on the territory of the former
German Democratic Republic, we found a small, Korean-run manufacturing plant that
had a significantly higher degree of closure in the societal dimension and a signifi-
cantly higher degree of openness in the anthropological dimension than any other busi-
ness. (It is a finding reminiscent of Yawata’s personal communication of August 13,
1994, that the rigors of constant change, reorganization, and innovation processes are
cushioned in some Asian countries by the social collective.) In the epistemological
dimension, this business did not differ from the rest of the sample. One can try describ-
ing a business’s interdimensional form of compromise between open and closed fea-
tures of organization in this way as well if a control group is available.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Notes on a Theory of Organizational Change
In contingency theories of the organization (Lorsch & Morse, 1974), the dominant
conceptual approach is that a business has to be internally structured in a way that
makes for a fit between the demands imposed by the environment and the qualities or
resources that exist within the organization. Changes in the form of organization are
hereby interpreted as responses to emerging misfits stemming primarily from environ-
mental changes of a technological, economic, or societal nature. We propose a com-
plementary perspective according to which a business does not react solely to changes
in the environment. Quite apart from them, it also reacts to changes within itself (see
“The Fluidity of Compromises,” above). Drawing on the concept of autopoiesis, our
first conclusion is thus that shifts in compromises can be described as partly self-
regulatory processes (Luhmann, 1984).
Because the environment changes as well (regardless of the inherent state of the
societal system), there are two sources of the resulting misfits between the demands on
the organization on one hand and that organization’s qualities or resources on the other
hand. We therefore deduce that the functionality of a specific organizational pattern
can only be temporary. This conclusion raises the issue of optimizing processes in
business organizations. It has been addressed many times in the literature by other
authors, with whom we agree that organizational structures are dilemmatic in charac-
ter (Aram, 1976; Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976; Neuberger, 1983; Quinn &
Cameron, 1988; Udy, 1990). The idea we underline is that the optimum can only be
temporary because of the twofold misfit. The effect is that the optimum must be con-
stantly recalibrated.
As unstable compromises between open and closed patterns, organizations
are extremely sensitive to interventions. Multidimensional, intensive, and abrupt
processes of openness and closure increase the vehemence of shifts in balance because
the parallel demand that exists for the opposite pole anyway is intensified by such overt
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trends and is not taken into account. (Such shifts in the balance occur if they go beneath
the “surface” and affect the organization’s deep structure, periods of change that Ger-
sick [1991, p. 19] called “revolutionary.”) The strategy of compromise between the old
and the new patterns reduces violent swings of the pendulum but is very likely to be
compatible with smaller oscillations between the poles, movement that is unavoidable
and purposeful in any case (Gebert & Boerner, 1995). To avoid jeopardizing the stabil-
ity of the societal system, it is necessary to avoid radical change.
Notes on a Theory of Organization
Some of the patterns of action simultaneously taking place in organizations foster
the open pattern; others, the closed pattern. Under certain circumstances, actions are
perceived as being contradictory. This experience would occur, for instance, if a busi-
ness encouraged organizational development by paving the way for participatory
strategies and organizational learning but simultaneously practiced organizational
transformation by having experts develop the new organizational structure and then
imposing it from the top (see Gebert, 1997). Such contradictory elements do not them-
selves constitute a breakdown in management. On the contrary, contradiction is neces-
sarily inherent in what is in principle the functional effort to achieve compromise or
balance. One additional consequence of our conceptual approach is that contradiction
and paradox has considerable functional potential (den Hertog, Philips, & Cobbenha-
gen, 1996; Quinn & Cameron, 1988; Remer, 1997). Another is that the ensuing
demand for compromise and balance is incompatible with the demand for an absence
of contradiction and (especially in Europe) for consistency and consonance of action
patterns.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT
OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
The new forms of organization pointed by Daft and Lewin (1993) (such as the tran-
sition to unhierarchical, network-like lateral patterns of cooperation) can be inter-
preted as a strategy of opening up. The insight gained by categorizing such forms of
organization as a process of opening is that the problem to be solved can be described
more precisely than has been the case. The problem is to mitigate the likely, unplanned
negative secondary effects of such processes of opening by reducing the corollary need
for closure (i.e., by means of processes of closure) without diluting the sought-after
merits of the opening (e.g., increased innovativeness). Managing the change thus
implies managing a dilemma, a topic we now address in terms of Lewin’s (1951)
familiar three-phase scheme of change: unfreezing, moving, and refreezing.
Unfreezing
Given that both the open and closed forms have at least some disadvantages that are
unavoidable, it is important to foster acceptance of this basic dilemma to dampen
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illusory expectations. One can facilitate acceptance of the dilemma by trying to
explain its nature to everyone connected with the company. The more insight the
affected people have into the basic structure of the dilemma and the more they see why
there are always costs in principle, the easier it is likely to be for these participants to
accept the costs as the price for the advantages that are reaped. On one hand, such
insight into the change process should be seen positively because it checks utopian
goals and corresponding disillusionment. On the other hand, it creates a problem, par-
ticularly in the phase of unfreezing, for when advantages and disadvantages are both to
be expected after change as well, it may be difficult to rally support for taking on the
stress and strain of a change process. To ensure sufficient willingness to engage in
change, the drawbacks of the current situation and the anticipated advantages of the
desired situation would actually have to be emphasized consistently. Management
would therefore be called on also to explain the purpose of paying the price and to illu-
minate the advantages of the desired practices so clearly that they come across as being
worth the cost and hard work they exact. Transformational leaders have repeatedly
proven crucial when it comes to generating sufficient support for the process of
change.
In our thinking, unfreezing requires the search for a balance between enlightening
the relevant people and rousing their enthusiasm (Mintzberg & Westley, 1992, p. 44).
Practically speaking, it is conceivable for the latter function (the focus on the purpose
of change) to be given to a senior manager and for the former function (the explanation
of “why”) to be underscored by other managers decentrally.
It is also paramount that the organization learn to describe its specific form of com-
promise. Which open and closed patterns of action are characteristic for the company
and to what degree (see Table 2)? As discussed in the second section of this article, one
can describe, or can try to inquire into, the possible combinations and mixes of open
and closed features in various ways. Empirical analyses of the impact of the survey-
feedback strategy (Gebert, 1997; Pasmore & Woodman, 1996) have shown that
respondents are clearly activated and stimulated when the description of the compro-
mise is communicated to them.
Moving
In the context of what is called the structural approach, the previously twofold mis-
fit makes it necessary to design all organizational measures (e.g., decentralization) in
such a way that they are reversible in principle. Moreover, it is important in the struc-
tural approach to meet the twofold demand that exists. One can satisfy this demand, for
example, by ensuring that freedom and individuality attained through decentralization
are complemented by ways to remain in touch with the social collective (e.g., by means
of opportunities for group work).
One important matter with the personal approach, especially among managers, is to
develop the skill and motivation to foster the ability to live in dilemmatic structures and
manage dilemmas appropriately. With regard to classical group-dynamic training,
whose purpose is primarily to convey what used to be referred to as authentic interac-
tion and openness, our approach is focused on helping people experience the
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attractiveness of both opening and closure processes. Subsequent maturation that
occurs through group dynamics is bound to make the people involved confront their
own demand for both open and closed structures to check unilateral pursuit of open (or
closed) structures.
Second, it is important to communicate strategies for actively working toward an
equilibrium between a social system’s conflicting demands for closure and openness.
Specifically, the demand for warmth and accessibility is an issue, but those qualities
must not be permitted to impinge on the competitive culture needed for continued
innovation, just as the implicit tensions inherent in the culture of conflict must not be
allowed to torpedo warmth and affinity. It is necessary in the personal approach to
point out these antagonisms, allow them to be experienced, and demonstrate how to
offset them better without being able to eliminate them.
Third, it is important in the personal approach to cultivate social sensitivity to rec-
ognize in time the shifts that are likely to occur in employee demands and needs as out-
lined in our approach. What are the signs that employees are trying to protect
themselves or that they might be experiencing a growing need for leadership that gives
them structure?
If processes of opening up are to be supported, it is imperative to reinforce the pat-
terns of action that are conducive to those processes. As we see it, there is always the
danger that processes of opening up will come at the risk of losing what is good about
the closed pattern, so in many cases those processes entail anxiety and imply a leap of
faith. (Such a leap is signaled when, say, employees take on increased responsibility or
have the courage to challenge their superiors for the first time.) Seen from this perspec-
tive, the positive reinforcement afforded by this leap of faith is thus of key importance.
The theoretically necessary corrective experience that responsibility can be accepted
without anxiety is more likely to be gained by employees when the requisite degree of
tolerance for mistakes is demonstrated consistently, the very act of accepting of
responsibility is positively reinforced, employee tendencies to redelegate responsibil-
ity is watchfully admonished, and management’s acceptance of such redelegation is
warily disapproved of.
Refreezing
The most important point from our perspective is that the classical interpretation of
refreezing must be abandoned. We are talking only about a relative degree of refreez-
ing. That is, the processes must remain reversible. Consequently, patterns of action
that the change process has shown to be problematic should be examined for the extent
to which they can be replaced by functionally equivalent, qualitatively less detrimental
patterns of action. For example, processes of openness may cause people to lose their
bearings within a company just as within society at large (see Table 1). Within the com-
pany, these problems of orientation can conceivably be dealt with by means of trans-
formational leadership. If the charismatic dimension in particular is considered
dangerous, especially because it implies that the effect of leadership is heavily depend-
ent on a single person, one could seek functionally equivalent alternatives for action by
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asking whether the visionary and the charismatic can be decoupled. It may be possible
to address the lack of direction in a company by trying to work out some quality of
vision in joint discussions without having it backed by a charismatic leader.
Last, a phase essential for successful refreezing is what could be called the status of
the situation between the two poles represented by the old world and the new. As
shown by the transformation of industrial plants in postcommunist countries, there
comes a point at which the merits of the old system no longer exist, the advantages of
the new system have not yet completely developed, and the drawbacks of the new sys-
tem are fully in evidence. We witnessed such circumstances in plants in Moscow
(Boerner & Gebert, 1997). In that situation, shaping the temporal horizon of expecta-
tion becomes a key dimension, one that brings us back to the dilemma discussed under
“Unfreezing.”
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